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Abstract 
The growing number of cross-border acquisitions has in many countries raised concerns about labor 
demand consequences. In this study, we use detailed firm level data to examine how increased 
internationalization and multinational activity affect the volatility of employment, or rather, the wage 
elasticity of labor demand. We analyze whether the wage elasticity of labor demand differs between 
multinational and non-multinational firms as well as between foreign-owned and domestic firms, and we 
are able to distinguish between different skill groups of employees. Moreover, we separate between an 
acquisition effect and a general ownership effect. Our results do not show any general difference in wage 
elasticities between different types of firms. 
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I. Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has played a key role in the globalization of the last 
decades. A striking feature of the growing FDI flows is that most investments in 
developed countries now take place in the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) rather than in the form of greenfield investments. The growth in FDI has 
increased the number of workers world wide that are employed in affiliates of foreign-
owned multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Jungnickel, 2002, p.2). This development has 
raised concerns among policy-makers, particularly about domestic jobs. Multinational 
firms tend to pay relatively high wages and inward FDI is believed to generate 
knowledge spillovers and productivity improvements but, on other hand, the “footloose” 
nature of multinationals is regarded as a threat to domestic jobs. Despite these issues 
having attracted a great deal of attention in the public debate, there is relatively little 
research on the topic.  
Detailed matched employer-employee data, spanning the period 1990–
2002, are used to examine labor demand consequences of increased foreign ownership in 
Sweden. We focus on how internationalization and multinationality affect the volatility of 
employment, or rather, the wage elasticity of labor demand. More specifically, we 
analyze the effect of foreign ownership and multinationality, as well as the impact of 
changes in ownership, on the wage elasticity of labor demand. Sweden is suitable for a 
study of this issue as it has experienced a dramatic increase in foreign ownership; the 
share of the total labor force employed in foreign-owned firms increased from about 9 
percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2005 (ITPS, 2006). Moreover, acquisitions are the most 
common form of entry mode for inward FDI in Sweden; almost 60 percent of the foreign- 3
owned firms have been established through acquisitions and about 6 percent through 
mergers (ITPS, 2006).
1  
There are several reasons to believe that foreign acquisitions of domestic 
firms and, foreign ownership or multinationality in general, may affect the elasticity of 
labor demand. However, it is unclear whether the change in ownership implies a 
permanent change reflected in a different elasticity of labor demand in foreign-owned and 
multinational firms as compared to domestic firms, or whether the shift in ownership 
itself leads to a temporary impact on the elasticity of labor demand. 
Previous empirical studies on the impact of foreign ownership on wage 
elasticity provide ambiguous results. For instance, Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) find in a 
study on several European countries that foreign affiliates have a lower wage elasticity of 
labor demand than domestic firms while Görg et al. (2006) report higher wage elasticity 
in foreign-owned firms in their study on Ireland. Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) suggest 
that the result might be caused by different skill compositions of the workforce in 
domestic and foreign-owned firms, in combination with differences in wage elasticities 
for different skill groups. However, they are unable to confirm their explanation due to 
lack of data on the skill composition of the labor force. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several respects. Previous 
empirical studies examine the difference between foreign and national firms whereas 
economic theory suggests that employment aspects may differ between MNEs and non-
MNEs. Multinational firms differ from local firms in their ability to shift production 
between different countries. The international organization enables multinational firms to 
                                                 
1 See also ITPS (2007) for a comprehensive report on the increased internationalisation of the Swedish 
economy.  4
react to changes in the cost of production, including wages, in a more flexible way than 
domestic firms by reorganizing and relocating parts of the production chain. Since a large 
share of national firms in developed countries are MNEs, with the same possibility as 
foreign firms to shift employment between affiliates in different countries, it is important 
to distinguish between the effects of multinationality and foreign ownership. We analyze 
whether the wage elasticity of labor demand differs between multinational and non-
multinational firms, as well as between foreign-owned and domestic firms.
2  
Moreover, previous studies only analyze ownership effects while we are 
able to differentiate between the immediate acquisition effect and the general ownership 
effect. As argued above, these effects may be essentially different. Finally, we distinguish 
between the effects on different skill groups to examine if aggregate differences in wage 
elasticities may be caused by firm-level differences in the skill composition of the labor 
force.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss 
the background to this paper and related empirical literature, section III describes data, 
section IV presents the empirical methodology, V presents the results and VI concludes 
the paper. 
 
II. Background and Related Empirical Literature 
The effect of international trade or trade liberalization on wage elasticities 
of labor demand has been examined in a number of studies.
3 Less explored is the issue of 
how multinational activity affects wage elasticities but different reasons why elasticities 
                                                 
2 Empirical studies on related issues also show that the important distinction is between MNEs and non-
MNEs rather than between foreign and domestic firms (see e.g. Heyman et al., 2006a and 2006b). 
3 See e.g. Faini et al. (1999), Krishna et al. (2001), and Slaughter (2001).  5
might differ between multinational and non-multinational firms can be distinguished 
from the theoretical literature.  
The first argument concerns a temporary effect caused by rent-sharing after 
acquisitions. More precisely, Nocke and Yeaple (2005, 2007) show that cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions may combine firm-specific assets of the target and acquiring 
firms to exploit complementarities. The link between firm-specific assets and FDI 
through acquisitions is also emphasized by Blonigen (1997). Such complementarities will 
create rents and economic internationalization will increase the pool of firms with 
complementarities (Norbäck and Persson, 2007). The created rents can be divided by 
different actors, such as the owner and employees, and may thereby result in temporarily 
changing wage elasticities of labor demand. There are also other studies which suggest 
that international acquisitions weaken the bargaining power of trade unions. For instance, 
Lommerud et al. (2006) use an international oligopoly model to study how the presence 
of trade unions affects firms’ merger decisions and wages. They show that wages become 
lower in international mergers as compared to purely national mergers. The underlying 
mechanism is a weakening of unions’ bargaining power. Weaker unions, following an 
international acquisition, can also lead to a temporary shift in wage elasticities.  
However, the wage elasticity of labor demand may also increase 
permanently after an acquisition, since an international production network enables the 
firm to react to changes in the cost of production, including wages, in a more flexible way 
than domestic firms by reorganizing the production chain and relocating parts of 
production. Ultimately, the possibility of such relocation depends on the degree of 
substitutability of employees in different countries. Brainard and Riker (2001) find that  6
the degree of substitution between employment in parent companies in the US and 
foreign affiliates is low. However, in another study, they show that substitution between 
employment in affiliates in alternative low wage locations is quite high (Brainard and 
Riker, 1997). Braconier and Ekholm (2000) use firm-level data on Swedish 
multinationals and find some evidence of substitution between employment in parent 
companies and subsidiaries located in high-income countries, but not between 
employment in parent and subsidiaries in low-income countries. Using firm-level data on 
multinational firms in all EU countries, Konings and Murphy (2001) also find that there 
is substitution of employment between parent companies and subsidiaries and that these 
effects are particularly important in the case of affiliates located within the EU. These 
findings are relevant for our study since any degree of substitution of employment 
between different locations of MNEs’ activities may translate into higher wage elasticity 
of labor demand among MNEs, as compared to firms without affiliates in other countries. 
There are also other reasons why wage elasticities may differ between 
multinational and non-multinational firms that are related to other firm characteristics 
than the existence of international production networks. For instance, Barba Navaretti 
and Venables (2004) argue that MNEs tend to be relatively capital intensive with a 
relatively skilled labor force, and with large market shares. High capital intensity makes 
wages a relatively low share of the total production cost and thereby a wage change has a 
lower impact on employment. Moreover, labor demand is typically less elastic for high-
skilled workers than for low-skilled workers which will also affect aggregate wage 
elasticities (Hamermesh, 1993). Wage elasticity may be lower in MNEs also if the MNEs 
produce differentiated goods and have relatively large market shares. In such cases, the  7
demand elasticities for MNEs’ products are relatively low, which may translate into 
relatively low wage elasticities.  
Previous empirical studies on FDI and wage elasticity of labor demand 
provide mixed evidence. Fabbri et al. (2003) examine wage elasticities of labor demand 
in the UK and US manufacturing industry for about thirty years since the early 1960s. 
They find increasingly elastic labor demand in both countries: elasticities have increased 
in absolute values from about –0.5 to –1.0. The authors argue that this is likely to be 
related to FDI, which has also grown over the examined period but they do not provide 
any formal analysis that can shed light on a possible causation.  
 Barba  Navaretti  et al. (2003) examine wage elasticities for domestically-
owned (including both multinational and non-multinational firms) and foreign-owned 
firms in 11 European countries between 1993 and 2000. Their study provides some 
interesting results. First, the speed of employment adjustment is higher in foreign-owned 
firms in all included countries. Moreover, the magnitude of adjustment is lower in foreign 
than in domestically-owned firms: short-run wage elasticities are higher for domestic 
firms than for foreign-owned firms in all countries except two, and long-run wage 
elasticities are higher for domestic firms in all countries. The unweighted short-run wage 
elasticity for the affiliates of foreign MNEs is about –0.6 and for other firms –0.7. Barba 
Navaretti et al. suggest that their result might be caused by different skill compositions of 
the workforce in domestic and foreign-owned firms, in combination with differences in 
wage elasticities for different skill groups.  
Görg et al. (2006) do not have any data on the skill level of employees 
either but still get a different result in their study on wage elasticities in a large survey of  8
domestic- and foreign-owned plants in Ireland over the period 1983–1998. They report 
somewhat higher wage elasticities in foreign-owned firms than in domestic firms. The 
point estimates suggest the wage elasticity to be about –0.44 in domestic firms and about 
–0.5 in foreign-owned firms (Görg et al., 2006, Table 2, column 3). An interesting feature 
of their study is a focus on linkages with the local economy and they find wage 
elasticities to be reduced with such linkages. 
Hence, the studies by Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) and Görg et al. (2006) 
give opposite results. A difference in the skill composition between MNEs and non-
MNEs, or a difference between Ireland and other European countries, might constitute 
one explanation. Another possible explanation could be that the studies compare 
elasticities in foreign and domestic firms rather than in MNEs and non-MNEs. It might 
also be the case that domestically-owned MNEs are of less importance in Ireland (the 
study by Görg et al.) than in most other European countries (the study by Barba Navaretti 
et al.).  
 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data in our study consist of register based data from Statistics Sweden. Firm- and 
plant-level data are linked together by way of unique identification numbers. The firm-
level data (FS) contain a large amount of detailed data for the period 1990–2002, 
including all manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees and non-manufacturing  9
firms with at least 50 employees.
4 A large number of variables are included such as value 
added, capital stock (book value), number of employees, wages, ownership status, sales 
and industry affiliation. The plant-level statistics (RAMS) add detailed information at the 
plant-level on variables such as the educational level of the labor force. It also adds data 
on wages for different educational groups. RAMS covers all Swedish plants for the 
period 1990–2002.
5 A detailed description of the variables is presented in Table A1 in the 
appendix. 
  To distinguish between different types of firms, we divide our sample into 
three groups: foreign-owned MNEs, domestically-owned MNEs, and domestically-
owned non-MNEs. A firm is a foreign-owned MNE if, according to information in the 
firm data, more than 50 percent of the equity is foreign owned.
6 We define a 
domestically-owned MNE as a firm reporting positive exports to other firms within the 
corporation. Finally, firms reporting no such exports are classified as domestically-owned 
non-MNEs.
7 To ensure that we have information on all our key variables, we will study 
manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees. 
Table 1 shows that if we divide our firms by nationality and multinational 
status, we find that most firms are domestically-owned non-MNEs. Approximately 50 
percent of our sample are multinational corporations divided equally between foreign-
                                                 
4 We have a stratified random sample for non-manufacturing firms with less than 50 employees. Data on 
financial sector firms are not available. 
5 The plant level data are aggregated to the firm level. 
6 Statistics Sweden uses the internationally common 50 percent cut-off in defining foreign ownership. 
We are not able to study whether the results are sensitive to this definition. However, other authors have 
examined the sensitivity in related studies (see e.g. Martins (2004) and Barbosa and Louri (2002)). These 
studies do not find the results to be sensitive to cut-off values. 
7 Export information is available for firms with at least 50 employees or smaller firms with large sales. 
There might exist a few small multinationals that are classified as local firms, due to missing information 
on exports. The potential bias is likely to be of minor importance.  10
owned MNEs and domestically-owned MNEs, an indication of how internationalized the 
Swedish manufacturing sector is.  
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
Foreign- and domestically-owned MNEs tend to be rather similar. This means that 
the major differences between firms are not between domestic and foreign firms, but 
rather between multinational and non-multinational firms. MNEs are generally larger, 
have higher average wages and value added, and employ more high educated workers. 
For instance, average firm size and value added are more than twice as high in MNEs 
than in non-MNEs.  
A large part of our analysis will focus on changes in ownership or, in other words, 
acquisitions. Our main interest is in firms that change ownership from domestic to 
foreign or from non-MNE to MNE, but we also include other types of acquisitions as a 
way of examining if it is ownership or the acquisition itself that has a possible effect on 
the wage elasticity of labor demand. Figure 1 shows the two types of acquisitions that are 
of our main interest over the sample period. Foreign acquisitions of domestic firms 
include acquisitions of domestic MNEs as well as non-MNEs, and acquisitions of non-
MNEs by MNEs include acquisitions by domestic as well as foreign MNEs. The number 
of acquisitions has increased since the early 1990s for both types and averages about 30 
per year each over the sample period.  
 
    -Figure 1 about here- 
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IV. Model and Econometric Approach 
 
Following the standard approach in the literature, we assume a constant returns to scale 
production function with two factors of production, capital and labor.
8 The demand for 
labor is given by Shepherd’s lemma and can be expressed as 
() ( ) ( ) [] , , , , w p Y r w l Y r w L
D =        (1) 
where w, r, and Y are wages, cost of capital and output, respectively. l is the amount of 
labor used per unit of output, and p is the price of output. The elasticity of demand for 





























= η .     (2) 
The first term on the right-hand side captures a change in labor demand from a change in 
wages and can be expressed as the share of labor in total production cost times the own 
Allen elasticity of substitution 
  LL L S σ .       ( 3 )  
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (2) is an indirect effect of wages on 
labor demand from the effect on output. Assuming that prices equal marginal costs, and 
once again using Shephard’s lemma, this term can be expressed as 
  φ L S       ( 4 )  
where, as previously,  L S is the share of labor in total production cost, and φ  is output 
demand elasticity. Combining equations (3) and (4), we can express total labor demand 
elasticity as  
                                                 
8 See e.g. Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).  12
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.     (5) 
Equation (5) shows that wage changes have a large impact on employment when the 
share of labor in the total production cost is high. Moreover, the effect on employment 
comes both from a substitution effect and from an effect on the price of the product and 
thereby on the quantity sold and the required quantity of labor. In view of the previous 
discussion, there are reasons why the elasticity might differ between MNEs and non-
MNEs. For instance, the first term on the right-hand side in Equation (5), the substitution 
effect, might be higher in MNEs that do not only have the possibility to substitute 
between different production factors but also between production factors in different 
countries. Moreover, if the share of labor in production is comparably low in MNEs, or 
the market power is relatively high (a small impact of cost changes on product demand), 
they will tend to have a low wage elasticity of labor demand. 
 
Estimation Approach 
In the first step of our econometric analysis, we aim at examining if there is an ownership 
effect on the elasticity of labor demand. We distinguish between foreign and domestic 
firms as well as between multinational and non-multinational firms. The former 
distinction is comparable with the one in Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) and Görg et al. 
(2006). In order to isolate ownership effects from other temporary effects caused by 
changes in ownership, we use observations only for firms that remain in one type of 
ownership, that is, domestic, foreign, multinational, or non-multinational firms during the 
entire period.   13
Based on equation (5) we specify the following dynamic conditional labor 
demand function for firm i in year t, 
 
it t i it it it it it it it e d d owner w owner y w l l l + + + + + + + + = − − ) * ( 5 4 3 2 2 1 1 0 α α α α α α  
 
where l, w, and y, are logged values of employment, wages per employee, and output, 
respectively. We use value added as a proxy for output. Variables di, dt, and eit are firm-
specific time invariant effects, time-specific effects and an i.i.d. error term, respectively. 
Hiring and firing of employees is presumably costly and the labor force is therefore rigid. 
Thus, we assume a dynamic model with up to two lags of the dependent variable as 
regressors. Owner is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is foreign-owned, and zero 
otherwise, or when we compare multinationals to non-multinationals, it is equal to one if 
the firm is a multinational. This variable is interacted with w to allow for ownership 
differences in wage elasticity. Our focus will be on α2 and α5. α2 is equal to the estimated 
elasticity of labor demand with respect to wages for the reference group. For instance, α2 
is, in the case of domestic vs. foreign firms, interpreted as the estimated wage elasticity 
for domestic firms, whereas the corresponding elasticity for foreign firms is equal to α2 + 
α5. The coefficients α0 and α1 measure the persistence in labor demand. Finally, α3 is 
interpreted as the short-run output elasticity. 
In the second step of our analysis, we focus on ownership changes. Firms 
that change ownership are compared to firms that do not change ownership. We study 
several different types of ownership changes, namely (i) from domestic to foreign, (ii) 
from domestic non-MNE to MNE, (iii) from domestic non-MNE to foreign ownership,  14
(iv)  from  domestic non-MNE to domestic MNE, and finally (v) from domestic MNE to 
foreign ownership. These different types of acquisitions can guide us to whether it is 
nationality of ownership, multinational status, or acquisitions per se that has the largest 
impact on labor demand elasticity. We are careful to restrict our sample separately for the 
different ownership changes in this part of the analysis, to avoid confusing different 
effects and have a clearly defined reference group of firms. For instance, we restrict our 
sample to firms that are either domestically owned during the entire period or change 
ownership from domestic to foreign when we analyze ownership type (i) above (from 
domestically to foreign owned). Similar restrictions are applied in the other types of 
acquisitions. 
Finally, we estimate separate labor demand equations for different types of labor 
to address labor heterogeneity. We are able to study if the effects on labor demand 
elasticity vary between different skill groups, since we have detailed information on the 
employees’ skill composition.
9  
     OLS is not appropriate in our study since lit-s  is endogenous to the fixed effects 
and to output, which gives rise to a “dynamic panel bias”. Therefore, we apply the system 
GMM approach developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
which implies that lagged values of lt and any other similarly endogenous variables are 
instrumented.  Another estimation method would be difference GMM developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator uses suitably lagged levels of the endogenous 
variables as instruments in the first differenced equation.  However, Blundell and Bond 
(1998) have demonstrated that lagged levels of variables may be weak instruments for the 
variables in first differences if the dependent variable is close to random walk. The 
                                                 
9 See Table A1 in the Appendix for information on how employees are classified in skill groups.  15
system GMM estimator, building on one equation in level and one in differences, 
improves efficiency by using more instruments. More precisely, the estimator uses first 
differenced and level versions of the estimating equation, where lagged values and lagged 
differences can serve as valid instruments for the former and the latter, respectively. The 
differentiated transformed instruments are assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
unobserved fixed-effects, implying that first differentiated variables can act as 
instruments for variables in levels, i.e. instrumenting levels with differences. A 
particularly important feature of the system GMM for our purpose is that it adds an 
equation in levels to the system and can, as opposed to difference GMM, estimate time-
invariant variables.  
The joint validity of the instruments may be tested with the Sargan/Hansen test. 
In addition, the validity of instruments depends on the assumption that there is no second-
order correlation of the residuals of the first-differenced equation. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) develop a test for the autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term eit that 
would render some lags invalid as instruments. 
The system GMM-analysis in this paper uses the algorithms provided by 
Roodman (2006). This algorithm takes into account that two-step standard errors are 
asymptotically more efficient, but have been reported to be downward biased. By 
implementing a Windmeijer (2005) correction to the two-step standard errors, a more 
efficient estimator can be reported. 
One drawback with the GMM is that results tend to be relatively sensitive to the 
choice of instruments and the choice of variables being instrumented (Fajnzylber and 
Maloney, 2001). This is particularly troublesome since most studies do not describe these  16
choices or whether the specifications differ between estimations. Our default 
specification instruments the lagged size variables, the wage elasticity variable, the 
ownership dummy variable, and the interaction term between ownership and wage 
elasticity. This specification will be used if it passes the three specification tests described 
above, irrespective of the coefficients or the significance level of the variables. If it does 
pass these tests, we continue by restricting the lag structure of instruments (first choice) 
or changing the variables being instrumented. In the results, we will show if we have 




We start in Table 2 by examining elasticities in a sample of firms that do not change 
ownership over the period. This criterion allows us to isolate the effect of ownership on 
wages and not run the risk of capturing an effect of the change in ownership itself – the 
acquisition. 
 
-Table 2 about here- 
 
The first estimation shows there to be a high persistence in employment as 
shown by the coefficient of 0.72 on lagged employment (column 1). Moreover, the wage 
elasticity is –0.16 which is lower than what has been found for many other countries 
(Barba Navaretti et al. 2003; Görg et al. 2006). Next, we examine if wage elasticities 
differ between foreign and domestically-owned firms by including an interaction variable  17
between foreign ownership and wages (columns 2 to 5). The interaction variable is not 
statistically significant (column 2), suggesting that there is no significant difference in the 
wage elasticity between foreign and domestically-owned firms. This result is in 
accordance with the cross-country study by Barba Navaretti et al. (2003), which also 
found no difference in the wage elasticity between domestic and foreign-owned firms in 
Sweden.  
Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) suggest that there might be differences in the 
skill mix of employees in firms with different ownership and that the wage elasticities for 
different skill groups differ. This could possibly explain their result of relatively low 
wage elasticities in foreign firms. We examine this by dividing our sample into low-, 
medium- and high-skilled employees (see columns 3–5). The results show that the 
elasticity in domestic firms is higher for medium-skilled than for low-skilled and that the 
wage elasticity for high-skilled is statistically insignificant. Moreover, foreign-owned 
firms have a higher elasticity of labor demand for medium-skilled employees, in absolute 
terms, than domestic firms. This is in contrast to the other two skill groups where we do 
not find any significant differences between domestic and foreign firms. It is interesting 
to note that this result corresponds to studies on off-shoring that find medium-skilled 
employees to suffer most from declining demand (Ekholm and Hakkala, 2005). We 
conclude by noting that we are not able to provide evidence of the wage elasticity of 
labor demand being lower in the high-skilled group, which in combination with a 
different skill composition of the workforce in domestic and foreign-owned firms would 
result in a lower elasticity in foreign firms, as suggested by Barba Navaretti et al. (2003).   18
Previous studies tend to follow the above approach and study the difference 
between domestic and foreign-owned firms. Theoretically, we would expect the relevant 
distinction to rather be between MNEs and non-MNEs. Therefore, we examine the 
difference in wage elasticities between these two groups in columns 6 to 9 in Table 2. 
The results suggest there to be no difference between wage elasticities in MNEs and non-
MNEs, neither in the aggregate nor for different skill groups. In particular, it should be 
noted that there is no difference in the medium skilled group, a result that opposes the 
finding in estimations on foreign- vs. domestically-owned firms. 
We follow previous studies in the literature and examine changes in 
employment in continuing firms. A related response to a wage increase could be to close 
a plant and expand activities in foreign affiliates (see e.g. Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003; 
Görg and Strobl, 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 2006; and van Beveren, 2007)). Bandick 
(2007) uses the same data set as ours to study this issue for Sweden. Interestingly, he 
finds that foreign-owned MNEs have the highest survival rates and, hence, a relatively 
low tendency to close down their Swedish affiliates. This, in turn, implies that our results 
are not driven by a higher risk of plant closures among foreign-owned firms as a response 
to wage increases.   
 
Acquisition effect 
Our second analytical approach is to analyze the effect of changes in 
ownership on wage elasticities. We follow this approach in Table 3 where a number of 
different types of acquisitions are included.  
  19
-Table 3 about here- 
 
The wage elasticity ranges between –0.10 and –0.20. Moreover, as in most 
previous estimations, there are no signs of a difference in the wage elasticity between 
domestic- and foreign-owned firms or between MNEs and non-MNEs.  
The wage elasticity is affected by the share of wages in total costs as seen in 
equation (5). As previously explained, wage changes will have a relatively high impact 
on changes in employment when the share of wages in total costs is high. Moreover, it is 
possible that multinationals exercise their ability to shift production between countries 
only when wage costs already constitute a substantial fraction of total costs. When wage 
costs are relatively small, any changes might have a minor impact on the employment 
decision. To examine this issue, we divide our sample into three equally large groups 
according to the wage share in value added. Firms with a relatively low wage share and 
the group of firms with a relatively high wage share are seen in Table 4. The group with a 
medium wage share has been omitted from the table. The results suggest that wage 
elasticities are higher in firms with high wage shares as suggested by theory, but it should 
be noted that many of the elasticities are statistically insignificant. One plausible 
explanation to insignificant elasticities is that the variation in wages declines when we 
divide our sample into high-, medium and low-wage firms.  
Moreover, there is no sign of a difference between foreign and domestic 
firms or between MNEs and non-MNEs. The interaction term between MNE status and 
wage elasticity is statistically significant among high-wage firms in acquisitions of non-
MNEs by domestic MNEs, but the quantitative effect is small. The results in Table 4  20
suggest that differences in wage shares do not imply differences in wage elasticities 
across firms as suggested by Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
 
  -Table 4 about here - 
 
We continue by estimating the effect of foreign acquisitions on different 
skill groups. The results in Table 5 show that foreign acquisitions decrease the wage 
elasticity in two thirds of the estimations, indicating lower elasticities in firms that have 
been acquired.  The results suggest that it is important to control for skills and that a 
change in ownership from domestic to foreign decreases the wage elasticity. Moreover, 
there seems to be a larger effect for medium and high-skilled workers than for low-skilled 
workers and also a larger effect for foreign acquisitions of domestic non-MNEs than for 
foreign acquisitions of domestic MNEs.  The latter result is consistent with the notion 
that multinationality rather than nationality is of importance for wage elasticities. 
However, we also find an effect after acquisitions by foreign owners of domestic MNEs 
which suggest that there are other mechanisms at work than only internationalization. 
One likely candidate is that the change in ownership itself has an effect on the elasticity.  
 
-Table 5 about here- 
 
We further examine the issue in Table 6 by looking at changes in ownership 
from domestic non-MNEs to domestic MNEs. If internationalization is the main cause for 
changes in wage elasticities, we would expect the same effect for a takeover of a  21
domestic non-MNE firm by a domestic and foreign MNE, respectively. The results 
suggest this not to be the case: there is a statistically significant effect of a change in 
ownership only for high-skilled workers and in this group, the coefficient is smaller than 
the one found in Table 5 for foreign acquisitions of domestic non-MNEs. The effect is 
even positive in Table 5 and negative in Table 6. 
 
-Table 6 about here- 
 
There are also other reasons for concern. For instance, there are estimations 
where the wage elasticity is statistically insignificant. In addition, the coefficients suggest 
that wage elasticity could be positive after an acquisition. Such positive wage elasticity is 
found for high-skilled workers after all types of ownership changes (Table 5) except for 
the acquisition of a domestic non-MNE firm by a domestic MNE (Table 6). This does not 
seem reasonable and the results could be caused by a temporary effect following an 
acquisition. The turbulence created by a change in ownership might temporarily diffuse 
the normal relationship between wages and labor demand. Low or positive elasticities for 
high-skilled workers are consistent with the idea that if acquisitions are driven by access 
to firm-specific assets, such as skilled labor, new owners are not very sensitive to wage 
costs of high-skilled labor but may even offer higher wages after the acquisition in order 
to prevent a loss of important firm-specific skills (Heyman et al., 2006b). 
To examine this issue further, we have analyzed the wage elasticity for 
individual years after a change in ownership.
10 For most types of ownership changes, the 
wage elasticity coefficients for individual years were statistically insignificant. In the few 
                                                 
10 The results are not shown but are available upon request.  22
instances where they were significant, we found an effect only in the first year after a 
change in ownership. This suggests that the effect in Table 2 may be a result of 
temporary effects due to complementarities generated by the acquisition as suggested by, 
for instance, Norbäck and Persson (2007) rather than by a long-run difference in labor 
demand between firms with different ownership.   
We have also divided our sample into high- and low-wage firms, as 
previously discussed, and examined the effect of acquisitions on different skill groups. 
There was no clear pattern of acquisitions affecting different skill groups differently 
depending on the wage share (not shown). 
To sum up the results, there are no strong indications of a general difference 
in the wage elasticities between firms with different ownership: domestically-owned vs. 
foreign-owned and non-MNEs vs. MNEs. However, we do find an effect of foreign 
acquisitions on wage elasticities in estimations on different skill groups. One plausible 
explanation is that this is caused by the acquisition itself, rather than by 
internationalization. Moreover, some tentative results indicate that the effect is temporary 
and that elasticities in firms with different ownership converge a few years after the 
acquisition. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
FDI, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions in particular, have increased substantially 
over the last decades. As a result, large shares of employees are in most developed 
countries employed in foreign-owned multinational companies. The increased importance 
of FDI has arguably benefited employees by, for instance, high real wages but there are  23
widespread concerns that it may also negatively affect job-security. The fear is that since 
MNEs can rather easily shift production between affiliates in different countries, job 
volatility will increase as a consequence. We examine one such aspect of job volatility, 
namely the wage elasticity of labor demand.  
Few studies have examined if wage elasticities differ between firms and 
those that do examine foreign vs. domestic rather than multinational vs. non-
multinational. Moreover, previous studies do not examine the effect of acquisitions on 
elasticities. Finally, these studies do not have any information on the skill levels of 
employees which could have an impact on wage elasticities. 
We start by examining wage elasticities in firms with different ownership 
and find no difference between foreign and domestic firms, or between multinational and 
non-multinational firms. Moreover, it has been argued in previous studies that the skill 
level of employees in foreign and domestic firms might differ and that the wage 
elasticities for different skill groups could also differ. We do not find this aspect to be 
important in the Swedish context: there is no robust difference between wage elasticities 
for employees of the same skill group employed in firms with different ownership. 
We continue our analysis by looking at the effect of acquisitions on wage 
elasticities. The results show an effect within different skill groups of employees. It 
seems that acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign owners, or acquisitions of non-
MNEs by MNEs, tend to reduce the wage elasticity. However, it is not clear what causes 
this effect. There is no effect after acquisitions of non-MNEs by Swedish-owned MNEs 
which suggests that there are other explanations than a pure internationalization effect. 
One likely explanation is that it is the acquisition itself that explains the changing wage  24
elasticity and we provide some tentative results suggesting that the diminishing effect on 
wage elasticity which is found is temporary and that wage elasticities converge shortly 
after the acquisition. One explanation is that acquisitions create rents generated by firm 
complementarities and that these rents are divided between different actors including the 
employees, which could temporarily change the wage elasticities.  
Hence, we conclude the paper by noting that there is no strong evidence of 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of firms with different ownership, 1990–2002. Means and standard 










owned MNEs  
 
MNEs 
Firm size  286    (935)  333    (706)  173    (532)  475    (1346)  408    (1094) 
Mean wage  205    (47)  226    (45)  201    (49)  213    (42)  219    (44) 
Mean wage, high-skill jobs  264    (75)  300    (65)  254    (78)  281    (66)  290    (66) 
Mean wage, medium-skill jobs  199    (37)  214    (36)  195    (37)  205    (35)  209    (36) 
Mean wage, low-skill jobs  187    (38)  199    (37)  186    (40)  190    (35)  194    (37) 
Value added   108    (244)  159    (251)  68    (158)  176   (335)  168   (298) 
Share of high-skill jobs  0.14   (0.13)  0.18   (0.13)  0.13   (0.12)  0.16   (0.13)  0.17   (0.13) 
Share of medium-skill jobs  0.53   (0.11)  0.53   (0.10)  0.53   (0.12)  0.53   (0.10)  0.53   (0.10) 
Share of low-skill jobs  0.33   (0.14)  0.29   (0.13)  0.34   (0.14)  0.31   (0.14)  0.30   (0.13) 
          
Number of observations  15,509  5,150  9,739  5,770  10,920 
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Domestic to Foreign  31
Table 2. The impact of foreign ownership and multinationality on wage elasticities. No ownership changes, 1990–2002. Dependent variable is 
log(size). 
  Total  Foreign vs. domestic  Multinational vs. non-Multinational 
    All    Low skilled  Medium 








































































































































































































































































Notes: Results from system GMM estimations. Absolute t-values within parentheses, based on robust Windmeijer (2005) corrected second step standard errors. 
AR(1) and AR(2) test for first- and second-order autocorrelation (reported p-values). Hansen is a test for over identifying restrictions (reported p-values). The 
results in columns 2, 5, 7, 8 and 9 are based on alternative specifications as discussed in Section IV.   *** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance at 
the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level.   32
Table 3. The impact of ownership changes on wage elasticities, 1990–2002. Dependent variable is log(size). 
 Domestic 






































































































































































Notes: Results from system GMM estimations. Absolute t-values within parentheses, based on robust Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected second step standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) test for first- and second-order autocorrelation (reported p-values). 
Hansen is a test for over identifying restrictions (reported p-values). *** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance 
at the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level.   33
Table 4. The impact of acquisitions on wage elasticities in firms with different wage shares, 1990–2002. Dependent variable is log(size). 
  From Domestic to Foreign  From Swedish non-MNE to 
MNE 
From Swedish MNE to 
Foreign 
From Swedish non-MNE to 
Swedish MNE 

















































































































































































































Notes: Results from system GMM estimations. Firms are divided into three groups according to the wage share in value added. The group of firms with medium wage shares 
is omitted. Absolute t-values within parentheses, based on robust Windmeijer (2005) corrected second step standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) test for first- and second-order 
autocorrelation (reported p-values). Hansen is a test for over identifying restrictions (reported p-values). *** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance at the 5 %-
level and * significance at the 10 %-level.   34
 
Table 5. The impact of acquisitions on wage elasticities for different skill groups, 1990–2002. Dependent variable is log(size). 
  From Domestic to Foreign  From Domestic non-MNE to Foreign  From Domestic MNE to Foreign 










Low skilled  Medium 
skilled 
High skilled 




















































































































































































































Notes: Results from system GMM estimations. Absolute t-values within parentheses, based on robust Windmeijer (2005) corrected second step standard errors. AR(1) and 
AR(2) test for first- and second-order autocorrelation (reported p-values). Hansen is a test for over identifying restrictions (reported p-values). ). The results in columns 1 and 
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Table 6. The impact of acquisitions on wage elasticities for different skill groups, 1990–2002, 
continued. Dependent variable is log(size). 
  From Domestic non-MNE to Domestic MNE 


























































































Notes: Results from system GMM estimations. Absolute t-values within parentheses, based on robust 
Windmeijer (2005) corrected second step standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) test for first- and second-order 
autocorrelation (reported p-values). Hansen is a test for over identifying restrictions (reported p-values). *** 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variables. 
Firm variable  Description  Source 
Wage  Average wage compensation per employee, including payroll 
taxes, 1990 year prices. 
FS 
Size  Number of employees.  FS 
Capital Intensity  Capital stock per employee, 1990 year prices.  FS 
Output  Value added, 1990 year prices (in 100,000 SEK)  FS 
High  Skilled  Share of workers with at least a 3 year post-secondary 
education. 
RAMS 
Medium skilled  Share of workers with 1–2 years of upper secondary education.  RAMS 
Low Skilled  Share of workers with at most 9 years of elementary education.  RAMS 
Foreign ownership  Dummy=1 if more than 50 percent of a firm’s votes are foreign 
owned. 
FS 
Industry affiliation  Industry classification based on two-digit SIC.  FS 
Note: Abbreviations: Financial Statistics (FS) and Plant-level statistics (RAMS). 